Acquisition path analysis: Analysis of all plausible acquisition paths; aim is to determine whether proposed safeguard measures are sufficient. More.

Acquisition strategy: Sequence of activities which a State could consider to acquire weapons usable material. More.

Anomaly: An unusual observable condition which might result from diversion of nuclear material or misuse of safeguarded items or which frustrates or restricts the ability of the IAEA to draw the conclusion that diversion or misuse has not occurred. More.

Conversion time: The time needed to undergo the changes in nuclear material to produce a nuclear explosive device. More.

Design information: Information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material. More.

Design Information Verification (DIV): The activities carried out by the IAEA at a facility to verify the correctness and completeness of the design information provided by the State. More.

Detection probability : The chance that a material will be found by IAEA safeguards. More.

Detection time: The maximum time that can occur in between the diversion of a material and the finding of that diversion by the IAEA. More.

Diversion path analysis: An analysis of all the possible outcomes for diversion of nuclear material from a facility. More.

Diversion rate: The amount of nuclear material that could be diverted at a given time. More.

Diversion strategy: A (hypothetical) scheme which a State could consider to divert nuclear material or to misuse items subject to IAEA safeguards. More.

IAEA Categorization of Radiological Material : A table for radiological materials based on their total activity divided by a given D-value and a definition that shows the potential harm from each category of A/D values. More.

IAEA Safeguards Approach: A set of safeguards measures chosen for the implementation of safeguards in a given situation in order to meet the applicable safeguards objectives. More.

IAEA timeliness detection goal: The target detection times applicable to specific nuclear material categories. More.

Integrated safeguards: A combination of safeguards available to the IAEA that allow the IAEA to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency of their obligations. More.

Safeguards measures: Methods that are available to the IAEA from safeguard agreements and additional protocols that allow the safeguards objectives to be attained. More.

Significant quantity: The amount of nuclear material that would allow the possible manufacturing of a nuclear explosive device. More.

State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material : The State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) comprises the organizational arrangements at the national level which may have both a national objective to account for and control nuclear material in the State and an international objective to provide the basis for the application of IAEA safeguards under an agreement between the State and the IAEA. More.

State-level safeguards approach: A safeguards approach that is determined and implemented for a specific State. More.