A continuous process of evaluating all information available to the IAEA about a State's nuclear program and related activities for the purposes of planning safeguards activities in the State and of drawing conclusions about the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards and about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the Stat. Evaluation is performed in three stages. The first stage involves an initial evaluation of the nuclear program of a State with a safeguards agreement in force, using all available information, for the purpose of drawing the conclusion about the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards. This evaluation provides a baseline for subsequent evaluations. The second stage follows the implementation of an additional protocol by a State and the IAEA's receipt of the initial Article 2 declaration; this evaluation is essential for drawing, for the first time, the conclusion about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State. The third stage involves the subsequent continuous evaluation (with periodic reports) of the State's nuclear programme, during which earlier evaluation results are reassessed on the basis of any new information received under declarations, from IAEA activities performed within the State and from external sources. This ongoing evaluation is critical for maintaining the IAEA's ability to regularly reaffirm the conclusions of the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities drawn for the State. In all stages, the evaluation process includes identifying and conducting follow-up activities to address any need for clarification or resolution of questions and inconsistencies.