The application of containment and/or surveillance to complement
nuclear material accountancy. The use of C/S measures is aimed at
verifying information on movement of nuclear or other material,
equipment and samples, or preservation of the integrity of
safeguards relevant data. In many instances C/S measures cover the
periods when the inspector is absent, thus ensuring the continuity
of knowledge for the IAEA and contributing to cost effectiveness.
Containment/surveillance measures are applied, for example:
- During flow and inventory verification, to ensure that each
item is verified without duplication and that the integrity of
samples is preserved;
- To confirm that there has been no change to the inventory
previously verified and thus reduce the need for
remeasurement;
- To ensure that IAEA equipment, working papers and supplies have
not been tampered with;
- If necessary, to isolate ('freeze') nuclear material that has
not been verified until it can be measured.
The indication of an anomaly by C/S measures does not
necessarily by itself indicate that material has been removed. The
ultimate resolution of C/S anomalies is provided by nuclear
material verification. If any C/S measure has been, or may have to
be, compromised, the IAEA shall, unless agreed otherwise, be
notified by the fastest means available. Examples of compromising
might be seals which have been broken inadvertently or in an
emergency, or seals of which the possibility of removal after
advance notification to the IAEA has been agreed upon between the
IAEA and the State.
Related Links
